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1. Introduction
China’s capital market entered a period of rapid development since the 2005 split share
structure reform, as more people became involved in the capital market as minority
investors. Currently, minority investors account for the majority of investors, and have
become an important force to promote the development of China’s securities market. If the
interests of minority investors are not assured, investors’ confidence will be impacted, which
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is not conducive to the stability and development of China’s capital market. Therefore, it is
essential to protect the rights of minority investors.
However, because the current investor protection mechanism is not yet sound, accounting
is likely to become a tool to perpetuate management’s personal gain, such as earnings
management. As a universal phenomenon in enterprises, earnings management not only
affects companies’ management activities, operating activities, and financial structure and
damages the company’s value (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010), but
also reduces the reliability of financial reports, which will ultimately impair investors’
interests (Dechow et al., 1996). Therefore, in the context of China’s vigorously developing
the capital market, studying the effect of the protection mechanism for minority investors on
earnings management has important theoretical and practical significance.
Most empirical studies to date have focused on only a few aspects of minority investor
protection, or have examined the protection effects solely on a national or regional level.
This paper focuses on the overall investor protection mechanism, and ventures into the
micro-firm level, based on a systematic and comprehensive minority investor protection
indicator system from the perspective of earnings management to explore the effect of
restraining management from exhibiting opportunistic behavior.1 This paper will also
examine the role of the nature of ownership on the relationship between minority investor
protection and earnings management because the nature of ownership in China results in a
different institutional environment for enterprises, which may affect the effectiveness of
minority investors’ protection mechanisms.
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses’ Development
There are two contrary hypotheses in theory regarding the relationship between investor
protection level and earnings management. One is the “transfer” hypothesis, which makes it
difficult, in terms of strong legal protection, not only for management to conceal the
business fact from outside investors, but also to implement the transfer of personal benefit,
thereby reducing their earnings management incentives. Another is the “punishment”
hypothesis, which suggests that a strong legal environment will lead to the further
implementation of earnings management behaviors, as negative earnings could lead to
greater punishment expectations. Leuz et al. (2003) studied non-financial sector companies
in 31 countries, and found that the degree of legal protection for outside investors is a key
determinant of financial information quality; the stronger the country’s investor protection,
1 Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) classify the accounting policy
choices into three categories: the opportunism behavior view, effective contract view, and information
view.
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the fewer earnings management behaviors are implemented, and vice versa. Shen and Chih
(2005) further extended the study to financial sector companies with an international
comparison, and found that a greater level of investor protection will curb banks’ incentive
to manage earnings. Enomoto et al. (2015) further distinguished between accrual earnings
management and real earnings management, and based on an empirical study conducted in
38 countries from 1991 to 2001, they found that in countries with a higher level of investor
protection, management was more inclined to substitute accrual earnings management with
real earnings management.
With the development of China’s securities market, more attention has been given to
investor protection, and in China, investor protection is more significant for the protection of
minor investors. Domestic scholars have also begun to focus on research in this area. For
example, Yuan et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between overvalued equity firms’
earnings management and the level of local investor protection level, and found that with
the higher level of investor protection in the region, there will be significant inhibiting of
accrual earnings management, to increase profits, and real earnings management, to decrease
profits. However, these studies only considered the macroeconomic view, such as the
national or regional levels of investor protection; research has not pursued investor
protection at the micro-firm level. These studies focused on the legal aspect, social norms,
or market mechanisms, and did not combine this variety of mechanisms to describe the
comprehensive effects on minority investor protection. Therefore, this paper will be based
on a comprehensive minority investor protection index, which was first developed by the
Research Center for Corporate Governance and Enterprise Development at Beijing Normal
University, to explore the relationship between the micro-enterprise level of minority
investor protection and earnings management, including both accrual and real earnings
management.
The protection of minority investors, as defined in the index, includes four aspects: (1)
investors’ right to know, which represents the level of information minority investors receive
regarding companies’ major business decisions; (2) investors’ right to make decisions and
supervise, which represents how minority investors exercise rights and supervise agents; (3)
investors’ right to receive returns, which indicates if minority investors’ earnings are ensured
by cash dividends or capital gains; and (4) investors’ rights’ execution environment, which
illustrates the system construction for minority investors to exercise and maintain their
legitimate rights and interests. We believe that investors’ right to know is the basis for
minority investors’ interest protection, their right to make decisions and supervise is the
method to protect minority investors’ rights and interests, earnings indemnification is the
purpose to protect minority investors’ right and interest, and rights execution environment is
the system guarantee for protecting minority investors’ rights and interests. If the above four
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aspects are strongly guaranteed, management will be subject to more rigorous supervision
and constraints, and subsequently more transparency and timely information disclosure will
leave less space for accrual earnings management. Accordingly, we propose the following
hypotheses:
H1: The level of minority investors’ protection is negatively related to the degree of
accrual earnings management.
However, management under performance pressure may choose to implement real
earnings management, which will not be easily identifiable, but could damage companies’
long-term value. The firms with a higher level of minority investor protection will have a
significantly increased cost of manipulating earnings, and this may blur the relationship
between the level of minority investor protection and earnings management. Accordingly, we
propose the following hypotheses:
H2a: The higher the level of minority investor protection, the more likely that
management will turn to implement the more concealed real earnings management.
H2b: The higher the level of minority investor protection, the higher the inhibition of
real earnings management implementation.
H2c: There is no significant relationship between the level of minority investor protection
and the degree of real earnings management.
3. Methodology
3.1 Measurement of Earnings Management
3.1.1 Accrual Earnings Management
There is inevitably a wide scope of accounting choices and professional judgment,
as accounting earnings are the results of implementing accrual accounting. By examining
the separation degree of net income and cash flows from operating activities,
and particularly after the removal of normal business accruals or non-discretional
accruals (NDA), the discretional accruals represent the manipulated part of
management, regardless of motive, which is the most commonly used method of
measuring the level of earnings management. Many studies have illustrated
that accrual items are an important method for many companies to manage and
manipulate accounting earnings. The higher the level of accrual, the higher the
likelihood that accounting earnings are to be manipulated, or that the level of earnings
management is higher (Healy, 1985; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989; Jones, 1991).
Therefore, the level of accrual can be measured as the companies’ level of earnings
management (Sloan, 1996; Houge and Loughran, 2000; Richardson et al., 2006). We
emulate previous studies by implementing a cross-sectional modified Jones Model to
estimate the magnitude of earnings management (Dechow and Sloan, 1995; Kothari et al.,
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2005).2 The estimation model is as follows:
(1)
Where TA denotes total accruals, A represents assert, REV denotes annual revenue, REC
represents accounting receivables, PPE refers to the property of permanent equipment, and
subscripts i and t represent firm and year, respectively.
We compute TA as post-tax operating profit, minus the net cash flow from operating
activities.3 To ensure comparability, every variable is divided by the total assets at the
beginning of the year. We estimate Equation (1) for firms in the same industry to estimate
NDA.
3.1.2 Real Earnings Management
We rely on the studies of Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) for the
level of real earnings management, and consider three metrics to represent the level of real
activities’ manipulation: the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (CFO),
discretionary expenses, and production costs.
The abnormal CFO, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs are
computed as the differences between actual values and the normal levels predicted from
Equations (2)-(4). First, we generate the normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses, and
production costs using models (2)-(4) (Roychowdhury, 2006), then deduct them from the
actual CFO, actual discretionary expenses, and production cost, respectively, to obtain the
abnormal CFO, discretionary expenses, and production costs.
(2)
(3)
2 Industry classification is based on the “Classification Guidance of Chinese Listed Companies” issued
by the CSRC in 1998. We group all listed companies following the CSRC industry classification
standard. However, because most companies belong to the manufacturing industry, we use
subcategories for the manufacturing industry, which results in a total of 21 industry categories.
3 There are two methods that can be used to calculate total accruals: the balance sheet method and the
cash flow statement method. Collins and Hribar (2000) believe that it is occasionally better to use the
cash flow statement method, such as in instances of mergers and acquisitions, non-recurring items,
currency conversions, etc. Using the balance sheet method to calculate total accruals may include
accruals generated from this special circumstance, which may overstate the discretional accruals.
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(4)
Where CFO denotes cash flow from operating activities, PROD denotes production costs,
DISEX denotes discretionary expenses, A denotes assert, and REV denotes annual revenue.
We compute the level of real earnings management to capture its total effects, as follows
(Cohen and Zarowin, 2010):
(5)
3.1.3 Level of Minority Investor Protection
We adopt the minority investor protection data published in the “Report on Minority
Investors’ Protection Index of China’s Listed Companies” (Gao et al., 2015), which includes
the overall score and four sub-index scores. The higher score indicates a higher level of
minority investor protection. The natural logarithm of the index is the measure for the level
of minority investor protection noted in this paper.
3.2 Research Design
Following the work of Lacker et al. (2007), we set the research model as follows:
(6)
Where DA and RDA represent the degree of accrual earnings management and real
earnings management, respectively, and CCMIBNU refers to the level of minority investors’
protection. Based on the definition above, CCMIBNU can be further deconstructed into four
sub-indices: (1) minority investors’ right to know (MIK); (2) minority investors’ right to
exercise decision-making and supervision (MIE); (3) minority investors’ right to receive
returns (MIR); and (4) minority investors’ right implementation environment (MII).
We also established five control variables: (1) company size (Size), represented by the
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year; (2) financial leverage (Lev),
computed as the end of the year’s total assets divided by the total liabilities; (3) company’s
growth (MB), calculated as the year-end market value of the company divided by the book
value of the company’s net assets; (4)the first largest shareholding ratio (Top1); and (5)
profitability, denoted as return on assets (ROA).
Existing research suggests the following: (1) The larger the company, the more likely it
will be subject to more oversight by, and concern from, government departments,
institutional investors, securities analysts, and investors. This condition may make these
firms more inclined to provide more information to the public, resulting in greater costs for
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implementing earnings manipulation practices (Rajan and Zingdes, 1995; Dechow and
Dichev, 2002). Therefore, there may be a negative correlation between company size and
earnings management. (2) Debt covenants may encourage enterprises to implement upward
earnings manipulation, as companies with mandatory provisions incorporated into loan
contracts usually have high discretional accruals (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney,
1994). (3) Companies with higher growth opportunities are more likely to achieve profit
targets through earnings management (Klein, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; Cheng and Warfield,
2005). (4) Higher first largest shareholder ratios result in stronger motivation and the ability
to manipulate earnings (Ming and Wong, 2003; Meng and Zhang, 2006; Wang and Tong,
2006; Zhang, 2010). (5) Dechow and Sloan (1995) argue that the return on total assets
should be controlled for the impact of firm performance on earnings management when the
discretional accrual is related to the firm’s performance. Lei and Liu (2006) found that the
return on total assets has a positive relationship with earnings management. We also
controlled for the industry factor in the model.
We also controlled for the industry effect in the model. The variables we use are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Definition of Variables
Variables Definition
DA the degree of accrual earnings management
RDA the degree of real earnings management
Fsize the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year
Lev the ratio of total liabilities at the end of the year to total assets at the
end of the year
MB the book value of the company’s net assets divided by the year-end
market value of the company
Top1 the first largest shareholding ratio
ROA return on total assets
LnCCMIIBNU the level of minority investors protection
LnMIK the level of minority investors’ right to know
LnMIE the level of minority investors’ right to exercise decision-making and
supervision
LnMIR the level of minority investors’ right to receive returns
LnMII the level of minority investors’ right implementation environment
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3.3 Sample Selection and Data Source
We chose all companies listed on the Chinese A-share market during 2014.4 Consistent
with similar studies, we excluded financial companies, and companies without necessary
data. As a result of these procedures, 2,376 observations were adopted for our final sample.
The minority investors’ protection index, including the sub-index of minority investors’ right
to know (MIK), right to exercise decision-making and supervision (MIE), right to receive
returns (MIR), and rights’ implementation environment (MII), are obtained from the “Report
on Minority Investors Protection Index of China’s Listed Companies” (Gao et al., 2015). All
data originates from the listed companies’ annual financial reports. Other financial data
derives from the WIND database.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all variables, and illustrates that in 2014, the
minority investors’ protection by China’s A-share listed companies is poor, and the average
score for minority investors’ protection (CMII) is only 44.79. From the perspective of the
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Min Mean Max P50 SD
DA 2374 -1.386 0.002 1.464 -0.001 0.108
RDA 2374 -3.786 0.006 1.472 0.015 0.203
FSIZE 2374 17.757 22.161 30.657 21.926 1.468
LEV 2374 0.0097 0.446 0.996 0.435 0.218
MB 2374 0.456 4.801 533.045 3.030 16.755
TOP1 2374 0.022 0.354 0.894 0.334 0.153
ROA 2374 -0.484 0.037 0.346 0.031 0.052
CCMIBNU 2374 24.326 44.794 61.312 44.897 5.512
MIK 2374 27.520 55.994 75.060 57.590 6.835
MIE 2374 3.182 35.583 75.909 36.818 11.039
MIR 2374 14.286 28.353 57.372 28.614 9.606
MII 2374 22.222 59.258 88.889 57.222 11.533
4 We use one year of data because information concerning the key variable for the level of minority
investors protection is available for only one year, which is the most comprehensive and systematic
evaluation index developed in 2014 by the Research Center for Corporate Governance and Enterprise
Development at Beijing Normal University.
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sub-index, the level of minority investors’ right to know (MIK) and minority investors’ right
implementation environment (MII) are relatively higher than in the other two sub-indexes.
The average degree of accrual earnings management is 0.002, while that of real earnings
management is 0.006, for the measurement of companies’ earnings management level.
4.2 Empirical Results and Analysis
4.2.1 Minority Investors’ Protection and Accrual Earnings Management
Table 3 reports the OLS regression results for Hypothesis 1, and notes the result of the
impact of minority investors’ protection on the degree of accrual earnings management
(DA). We report the regression results of the minority investors’ protection index in column
1, and the four sub-indices in columns 2-5 as the independent variables. Table 3
demonstrates that the regression coefficient of the minority investors’ index (CMII) is
-0.045, which is at the 1% significance level, indicating that there is a significant negative
correlation between minority investor protection and the degree of accrual earnings
management. Furthermore, because the degree of accrual earnings management has a
negative and significant coefficient in the regressions of minority investors’ right to know
(MIK) and minority investors’ right implementation environment (CMII), yet no significant
relationship with minority investors’ right to exercise decision-making and supervise (MIE)
and minority investors’ right to receive returns (MIE), we interpret these results to indicate
that the governance mechanism of protection for minority investors’ rights to know, and the
environmental construction for them to implement their rights, play a key role in reducing
the degree of accrual earnings management.
4.2.2 Minority Investors’ Protection and Real Earnings Management
Table 4 reports the OLS regression results for hypotheses 2-4, and relays the result of the
impact of minority investors’ protection on the degree of real earnings management (RDA).
We report the regression results of the minority investors’ protection index in column 1, and
four sub-indices in columns 2-5 as the independent variables. Table 4 demonstrates that the
regression coefficient of the minority investors index (CMII) is 0.008, which does not reach
a significant level, indicating that there is no significant correlation between minority
investors’ protection and the degree of real earnings management. Furthermore, there are no
significant correlations between minority investors’ rights and the four sub-indexes. These
empirical results support the suggestion in hypothesis 2c, which is that there is no
significant relationship between the level of minority investors’ protection and the degree of
real earnings management.
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4.2.3 Minority Investors’ Protection and Accrual Earnings Management: Divided by
the Nature of Ownership
We further divide the samples by the nature of ownership to check if there are
differences between state-owned enterprises (SOE) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOE)
to calculate the effect of minority investors’ protection on accrual earnings management.
Table 3. Regression Results of Minority Investors’ Protection and Accrual Earnings
Management (DA)
Variables DA DA DA DA DA
LnCCMIBNU -0.045***
(-2.580)
LnMIK -0.027*
(-1.657)
LnMIE -0.001
(-0.208)
LnMIR -0.001
(-0.147)
LnMII -0.031***
(-3.003)
Fsize 0.001
(0.512)
0.001
(0.302)
0.000
(0.048)
0.000
(0.033)
0.001
(0.517)
Lev -0.012
(-0.871)
-0.013
(-0.927)
-0.011
(-0.832)
-0.012
(-0.847)
-0.012
(-0.913)
MB 0.000
(1.215)
0.000
(1.115)
0.000
(1.263)
0.000
(1.258)
0.000
(1.319)
Top1 -0.015
(-1.042)
-0.014
(-0.945)
-0.014
(-0.989)
-0.014
(-0.980)
-0.016
(-1.084)
ROA 0.475***
(10.297)
0.461***
(10.098)
0.457***
(10.010)
0.459***
(9.744)
0.459***
(10.079)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y
_cons 0.148**
(2.035)
0.097
(1.314)
0.003
(0.058)
0.002
(0.044)
0.104*
(1.845)
N 2374 2374 2374 2374 2374
Adj-R2 10.91 10.77 10.66 10.66 11.00
F 17.149 16.904 16.735 16.733 17.297
Note: *** represents significance at the 1% level. ** represents significance at the 5% level.
* represents significance at the 10% level.
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Table 5 notes the test results for state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in
column 1 and column 2, respectively. We can observe from the first column of Table 5 a
significant negative coefficient on minority investors’ protection (CMII) and discretional
accruals (DA) for state-owned enterprises. However, in column 2 of Table 5, the coefficient
on minority investors’ protection (CMII) and discretional accruals (DA) for non-state-owned
Table 4. Regression Results of Minority Investors’ Protection and Real Earnings
Management (RDA)
Variables RDA RDA RDA RDA RDA
LnCCMIBNU 0.008
(0.241)
LnMIK 0.015
(0.467)
LnMIE 0.003
(0.290)
LnMIR -0.010
(-0.839)
LnMII 0.013
(0.648)
Fsize -0.001
(-0.201)
-0.001
(-0.233)
-0.001
(-0.183)
-0.001
(-0.143)
-0.001
(-0.262)
Lev 0.057**
(2.135)
0.058**
(2.154)
0.057**
(2.116)
0.056**
(2.117)
0.057**
(2.147)
MB -0.000
(-0.376)
-0.000
(-0.339)
-0.000
(-0.383)
-0.000
(-0.399)
-0.000
(-0.392)
Top1 0.016
(0.559)
0.015
(0.543)
0.016
(0.564)
0.016
(0.567)
0.016
(0.575)
ROA -0.797***
(-8.871)
-0.796***
(-8.946)
-0.794***
(-8.932)
-0.775***
(-8.459)
-0.795***
(-8.944)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y
_cons -0.027
(-0.193)
-0.054
(-0.375)
-0.009
(-0.099)
0.029
(0.312)
-0.044
(-0.403)
N 2374 2374 2374 2374 2374
Adj-R2 4.43 4.44 4.44 4.46 4.45
F 7.117 7.127 7.119 7.155 7.138
Note: *** represents significance at the 1% level. ** represents significance at the 5% level.
* represents significance at the 10% level.
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enterprises is not significant. This result suggests that the significant negative relationship of
minority investors’ protection and the degree of accrual earnings management is primarily
due to the function exerted in state-owned enterprises. The reason may be that the “one big
share dominance” phenomenon is taken more seriously in state-owned enterprises in China;
therefore, in this type of enterprise, the effect of protection for minority investors will be
further emphasized.
Furthermore, from the empirical results illustrated in columns 3-6, we find that the
Table 5. Minority Investors’ Protection and Accrual Earnings Management, Divided by
Nature of Ownership
DA
SOE
DA
NSOE
DA
SOE
DA
SOE
DA
SOE
DA
SOE
LnCCMIBNU -0.079***
(-2.914)
-0.020
(-0.873)
LnMIK -0.020
(-0.843)
LnMIE -0.018*
(-1.778)
LnMIR -0.007
(-0.815)
LnMII -0.035**
(-2.159)
Fsize -0.001
(-0.408)
0.002
(0.552)
-0.002
(-0.676)
-0.002
(-0.720)
-0.002
(-0.792)
-0.002
(-0.596)
Lev 0.027
(1.425)
-0.054***
(-2.636)
0.029
(1.500)
0.030
(1.556)
0.029
(1.526)
0.027
(1.438)
MB 0.000**
(2.236)
-0.000
(-1.471)
0.000**
(2.256)
0.000**
(2.358)
0.000**
(2.340)
0.000**
(2.363)
Top1 -0.024
(-1.195)
-0.002
(-0.080)
-0.021
(-1.019)
-0.023
(-1.144)
-0.021
(-1.021)
-0.022
(-1.088)
ROA 0.700***
(9.637)
0.304***
(5.075)
0.671***
(9.306)
0.664***
(9.232)
0.680***
(9.218)
0.673***
(9.363)
Industry Y Y Y Y Y Y
_cons 0.301***
(2.702)
0.046
(0.431)
0.094
(0.916)
0.081
(1.226)
0.043
(0.690)
0.151*
(1.831)
N 1296 1078 1296 1296 1296 1296
Adj-R2 11.96 12.81 11.43 11.60 11.42 11.70
F 10.776 9.793 10.282 10.438 10.279 10.533
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function of minority investors’ protection on inhibiting the degree of accrual earnings
management is primarily due to the effect of minority investors’ right to exercise decision-
making and supervision, and assurance for the right implementation environment.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use minority investors’ protection data from the Corporate Governance
and Enterprise Development Research Center of Beijing Normal University to examine the
impact of minority investors’ protection on earnings management, and further observe the
influence of the nature of ownership on their relationship. We find that effective minority
investor protection can significantly inhibit accrual earnings management, and there is no
effect on real earnings management. In addition, the internal mechanisms to restrain accrual
earnings management contribute differently: the mechanism to guarantee investors’ right to
know and the system construction for rights implementation can significantly lower the
degree of accrual earnings management, while the other two have no significant effect.
After considering the nature of ownership, we find that the protection for minority
investors of state-owned companies is more effective than that of non-state-owned
companies. The reason may be that the “one big share dominance” phenomenon is taken
more seriously by Chinese state-owned enterprises, and the effects of protection for minority
investors will be emphasized in this type of enterprise. Research indicates that the function
of minority investors’ protection to inhibit the degree of accrual earnings management
occurs primarily because of the effect of minority investors’ right to exercise decision-
making and supervise, and assurance of the right implementation environment.
This paper’s analysis reflects that the level of minority investors’ protection has a
significant role in improving the quality of accounting earnings information. The
construction must be continuously strengthened for minority investors’ right to know, rights
to exercise decision-making and to supervise, and the right implementation environment,
which will further improve the protection mechanism for minority investors in Chinese
listed companies. This paper enriches the study on the economic consequences of minority
investors’ protection, and provides meaningful insight for Chinese listed companies as to
how to resolve the agency problem, restrain operators’ earnings management, and improve
the quality of financial information.
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